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In the July-September 1986 issue, VikaJpa published an article by S K Barua and V Raghunathan on "Inefficiency of the Indian Capital Market."
Based on the way the markets actually function, Ramesh Gupta questions in this article the validity of the assumptions used in arguing that the Indian capital market is inefficient. Far more than inefficiency; the problem with the Indian market is its excessively speculative character, by permitting trading on low margins in carry forward transactions. He also makes suggestions on how to restrict speculation and protect the interest of investors.
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S K Barua and V Raghunathan argue in their article "Inefficiency of the Indian Capital Market" (Vikalpa, July-September 1986 ) that the Indian capital market is inefficient. Their argument is based on a hypothetical example (see Box titled "Risks and Returns of Two Investors") of two investors C and D who start with identical assets on September 15, 1986, but follow different strategies in the market. Barua and Raghunathan have calculated the returns for the two investors under certain assumptions. They argue that investor D who took no risk earned more than investor C who took a risk. Barua and Raghunathan test for sensitivity in returns to D for different rates of carry forward charges and ex-rights prices of a Reliance share. Since returns to D exceed those of C for several rates and prices, the authors conclude that the Indian capital market is inefficient as the market was unable to adjust prices to reflect risks. They proceed to find fault with the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI) for fixing prices for primary issues lower than what the market would have.
In both their analysis and recommendations, Barua and Raghunathan have missed the peculiarities of the Indian stock market. These peculiarities not only invalidate their example but also make their conclusions erroneous-.
There are, at least, four peculiarities of the Indian stock market they have ignored. These are:
• Category A shares do not constitute a "forward market" • Carrying forward an outstanding sale position is not always possible. Counting on carrying forward for a whole year, as investor D does, is risky • Speculators and regulators determine the carry forward rates and prices Are the higher returns to D justifiable given that the risks he assumes are less than those of C? The authors answer this question in the negative and label the capital market as "inefficient."
Risks and Returns of Two Investors
• Small investors do not have an easy access to trading on a forward basis.
They are discussed next.
Category A is not a Forward Market
In a forward market, delivery cannot be enforced before the agreed upon date. The forward price would differ from the spot price and both would be known when a forward deal is put through. That is not the situation when one trades in category A shares on the Indian stock market. The carry forward basis facilitates speculation about future prices without an agreed upon price and delivery date. It enables the buyer and seller to enter into a transaction today at today's prices, without the buyer having the money or the seller having the shares.
Long Period Carry Forwards
On the settlement date, which is usually every fortnight, a buyer can carry forward the transaction to the next settlement date by paying the seller a small premium, called the badla charge. In normal circumstances, the badla charge is related to the interest charges for short term borrowings. Carry forward is possible when the supply of a share is greater than the demand for it on the settlement da l e. The market is said to be in an overbought position. The reverse happens if the market is an oversold position on the settlement day with those who have sold short being unable to deliver the shares. In such a situation, the short seller of the share has to pay the buyer a small premium, called undha badla or a backwardation charge, to carry forward the transaction to the next settlement date.
There is a settlement crisis if one of the parties to the transaction refuses to carry the transaction forward to the next settlement date. The extent of the crisis determines the charges and may provoke intervention by the stock exchange authorities in fixing rates or in banning all further trading in the share.
Data are not available on how long an individual buyer or seller has continued an initial position through successive carry forward settlements.
In a relatively inactive security like MRF or Zuari Agro, it may be possible to continue to carry forward for a long period. However, in a highly active security such as Reliance, where large amounts and a wide range of interests are involved, it would not be possible to assume continuing availability of carry forward facility over a long period of time. Given the price fluctuations, either party can insist on a settlement and force a showdown or a crisis on the other.
Determination of Make-up Prices and Carry Forward Charges
The price at which the transactions in a share are to be carried forward is called the make-up price and is decided by the Bombay Stock Exchange. The make-up price of a security is generally the last transaction price in the settlement period. The make-up price may favour the buyer or the seller depending upon the earlier price at which the transaction was initiated or is outstanding. The buying and selling parties to a transaction have to settle by paying or receiving in cash the difference between the make-up price and the price at which the transaction is outstanding. If the make-up price is higher than the outstanding transaction price the seller pays the buyer difference. Vice-versa, if the make-up price is lower than the outstanding transaction price, then the buyer pays .the seller the difference. To avoid such payments, if possible, buyers and sellers both try to ensure a particular price on the settlement day to suit their plans and position. In any case, all outstanding transactions h»ve to be settled at one make-up price. There is a payment crisis if the amounts involved are large and buyers or sellers are unable to pay, warranting the stock exchange authorities to intervene. Thus, an operator in a forward market would need to have enough liquidity to carry forward transactions. Such needs would vary and cannot be estimated accurately.
Assuming successful settlement, the outstanding positions have to be carried forward to the next settlement date. To do so, the buyer normally pays, as already described, a badla charge to the seller.
The carry forward charges depsnd upon the relative bought or sold position of the traders. If it is an overbought position and buyers are finding hard to arrange payments for delivery, they would be willing to pay slightly higher charges. Similarly, if the sellers are in an oversold position and do not have shares for delivery, bulls may force backwardation charges. If bulls are out to squeeze bears (for whatever reasons), bulls may force bears to arrange the delivery or failing which dictate a price at which they would be willing to settle the outstanding transactions. In the Reliance case, it has happened twice: once in 1981 and the second time, more recently, in 1987. Both times, it created a crisis in the market and bulls pleaded to the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) to intervene. BSE intervention is arbitrary and unpredictable.
Thus the outcome of a carry forward option for long periods is uncertain. It is definitely not free of risk, especially for D-type speculative investors. For, when regulatory authorities intervene to correct any crisis situation, D-type investors are more likely to suffer than C-type investors.
Margin Money
In addition, the stock exchange insists on margin money from buyers and sellers to ensure that they will be able to honour the transactions on the next settlement day. The amount of margin money required varies depending the level of activity in the share, its volatility, and any need to curb speculation or imbalance in the outstanding position. The authorities may fix different margins tor bears (or shortsellers) and bulls for the same share to correct an imbalanced position. If the margin required is Rs 40 a share and a buyer has purchased 10000 shares which he wants to carry forward to the next settlement date, he has to deposit a margin of Rs 4 lakh. Margins have varied between 5 and 20 per cent of the make-up price. On volatile securities, margins are much higher.
Trading on Carry Forward Basis
It is not easy for a small investor to buy or sell on a carry forward basis through a broker. Most brokers do not accept such transactions. Before proceeding to conclude whether the market is efficient it would be useful to understand how the market functions in realitv.
Functioning of the Market
The best way to understand the functioning of the market may be to analyse some of the recent events on the market associated with Reliance shares.
In 1982. some smart investors tried to make extra profits by operating simultaneously in forward and cash markets in Reliance securities. In March 1982, Reliance Series III debentures were quoted around Rs 175 and the Reliance equity share was around Rs 125. Twenty per cent of the Series III debentures (face value Rs 125) were due to be converted into one equity share in September. In March 1982, by buying a debenture for Rs 175 and selling the Reliance share short for Rs 125, an investor could earn about Rs 40 within six months. He invests Rs 175 in a debenture in March and realizes by September Rs 215-Rs 125 from the sale proceeds of a share and Rs 90 as the non convertible portion of a debenture. Several investors tried this route.
As a result, the estimated short sale in Reliance shares by April 1982 was 8.72 lakh shares. On April 30, 1982, the buyers asked for delivery. The brokers who had a short sale position were in trouble. They tried to square off the short position. The share price skyrocketed from Rs 125 to Rs 190 per share and still there remained a shortfall of 2.72 lakh shares. According to rules, an auction should have taken place. To avoid a payment crisis, BSE authorities intervened and a settlement was arrived at.
One may argue that Dhirubhai Ambani manipulated the situation and forced delivery of shares. Probably he did. But even if he did not, others who bought in the forward market could have moved in a similar direction. Those who genuinely believed that a Reliance share was good investment would definitely demand delivery instead of paying carry forward charges. Since our smart investor does not own the share on that date, he would default and bear the consequence. Speculative buyers, on the other hand, can threaten to arrange funds at a little over the prevailing interest rates and force shortsellers to settle the outstanding position on their terms.
In January 1987, a similar kind of situation arose. To save the shortsellers, BSE authorities intervened and limited the backwardation charges. This time, the authorities were probably acting as regulator to protect the innocent investors whose share certificates were held up by the company's transfer agents. BSE was protecting investors who were selling their equity holdings so that their total commitment in Reliance remained unchanged even after they subscribed to G series debentures.
Position of Stock Markets Today
There are 14 stock exchanges in India now, the principal one being in Bombay. The Bombay Stock Exchange was established in 1875. A total of 2610 securities was listed on BSE as on December 31, 1985 . The total market value of these securities was Rs 20,378 crore, of which Rs 10,692 crore or 50 per cent was represented by the top 40 companies. Reliance alone constituted 6 per cent. The top five companies-Reliance, TISCO, Hindustan Lever, L & T, and GNFCtogether accounted for 20 per cent of the total market value. Most of the activities were confined to these securities.
Of the 2610 listed securities, 63 are in the specified category (A group). Of these 63 A group securities, most of the transactions were confined to four or five securities, namely TISCC, Reliance, Orkay, Bajaj Auto, and L & T. A few more securities like Century, Premier Auto, ACC, GSFC, and Tata Tea can be said to be periodically active (close to the announcement of their annual results) and large in terms of the volume of transactions.
To curb speculation, forward trading was 24 Vikalpa banned in June 1967 It was expected that transactions would be settled immediately by paying for delivery of shares in cash or credit. Bank credit for purchase of securities was prohibited after the nationalization of banks in 1970 as it was considered an unproductive use of scarce credit.
As a result, the volume of transactions in securities reduced considerably. To revive the volume of transactions, provide liquidity to the stock market, and maintain continuity in stock prices, the governing board of BSE, which is dominated by the stock trading community, has devised the current system.
The system categorizes securities into two groups: A group also known as specified securities or forward securities (forward is actually a misnomer) and B group, known as cash securities. Trading in A group securities is possible by putting up margin money only. For trading in B group securities full cash is to be paid against delivery of securities at the end of settlement.
As described earlier, transactions in A group securities are not forward transactions. However, a transaction can be carried forward on depositing a small margin amount as security with BSE and paying carry forward charges to the other party to the transaction.
Low Stakes on Trading in Specified Shares
Margin money deposits are normally 3 to 5 per cent of the stock price. In some securities which show an unusual volume and/or price variation, BSE may prescribe a higher margin to discourage speculation. For example, margins for settlement No.9 of April 9, 1987, on bears in Orkay was Rs 35 on a make-up price of Rs 80, or about 40 per cent. On Reliance, it was Rs 50 on a make-up price of Rs 200, or 25 per cent. The make-up price and margins on other securities are given in Table 1 . As can be seen from the table, the margins imposed on most of the securities were less than 10 per cent. Secondly, a higher margin was imposed on bears (shortsellers) than on bulls (buyers). This was a sequel to heavy shortselling after the budget. In fact, on March 9, BSE banned short-sale entirely to curb speculation and restricted the activities of jobbers. 
Speculators Dominate
Because the margins required for carry forward transactions are very low, speculators dominate the market. Given that price fluctuations of 5 per cent in a day are common for active securities, the margin of between 3 and 10 per cent should be considered low. With small amounts at stake, speculators are able to accumulate unreasonably large volume positions. Such imbalance positions result in violent fluctuations in security prices, throwing the market out of gear.
If a particular group of speculators (bulls or bears) asks for a settlement, a payment crisis develops. The government through its nominee, the executive director of BSE, tries to regulate the market. The governing board which is mostly controlled by the same member brokers (speculators) and the executive director act, in reality, more often as a smokescreen to fool the gullible investors. Since BSE does not take responsibility for defaulting parties, a workable solution is evolved, by various pulls and pressures, mostly at the cost of innocent investors. If the stockbroking community is unable to resolve a settlement or payment crisis, financial and investment institutions such as the Unit Trust of India and Life Insurance Corporation are called upon to step in with their large holdings of securities and cash.
It must be clear from our analysis of the stock market that the Indian capital market is not inefficient. It is highly speculative and crisis-ridden. Its regulation also favours speculators rather than the development of a healthy investor-oriented market.
What Should be Done?
The authorities must realize that:
• The present system of trading on Dalai Street favours speculation. Eighty to ninety per cent of the trading is in speculative securities (A group). Even there, four to five securities ac count for 40 to 50 per cent of all transactions • Although forward trading is banned, buying and selling short on margins are being permit ted through a dubious mechanism of carrying forward such transactions
• Margins required are low. They defy all norms of debt-equity ratios. While for most produc tive activities the debt-equity norm is 2:1 (4:1 for new projects now), for speculative trading the stock market norm is an unconscionable 20:1. Such low margins on buying and selling encourage unsustainable speculation • BSE, as it is structured now, is unable to regu late speculative activities. The market often faces payment crisis, delays in settlement, and frequent closures.
To develop a healthy investor-oriented capital market, a better administration of purchase and sale on margins is needed. Margins should be high enough to ensure completion of transactions if settlements are forced. The principle of leverage must come into play.
In the United States, trading in securities on margin is allowed but it is highly regulated and monitored regularly. What the margin requirement should be is not a matter, of negotiation or whims and fancies of the stock exchange authorities. The initial margin requirements are determined by the Federal Reserve System in order to control and regulate the volume of credit. In addition, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has its own margin requirements.
The Federal Reserve System set the margin requirements first in 1934. Since then, it has varied the required margin between 40 and 100 per cent of the purchase price. At present, it is 50 per cent.
In addition, NYSE has its own requirements for smooth functioning of the market. It insists on a maintenance margin that is required of each account at the end of each transaction day. The maintenance margin requirement is 25 per cent of the current market value of securities. Whenever the deposits brokers and their clients maintain as collateral fall below 25 per cent of the current value, the account holders are called upon to increase their collateral. They have to increase it to a higher level of 35 per cent of the current market value so as to allow some leeway for further price fluctuations. If the account holder fails to deposit the extra amount demanded, a part of his existing holding is auctioned to bring his collateral to the desired level. A strict follow-up of margin requirements ensures smooth functioning of the market. Vol. 12, No. 2, April-June 1987 Even in a highly capitalistic economy like the United States with millions of widely spread shareholders and high volumes of trading, excess speculation is being curbed on regular exchanges through control of credit for trading and through a requirement that traders put in a high equity margin. However, trading in future prices is permitted through option trading in a separate market.
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In socialistic India with a lower spread of equity holding and in spite of banning credit for speculative trading, we have permitted, through devious methods, both credit as well as low equity for traders. Speculative trading is excessive in relation to the investors' transactions; it can be curbed through higher margin requirements and continuous monitoring.
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